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START: Overcoming Remaining 
Challenges
By Elizabeth Zolotukhina
Introduction
During the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir 
Putin, the governments of Russia and the United States could not agree 
on how to codify their balance of strategic offensive nuclear forces after 
the existing Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) expired on 
December 5, 2009.1 The United States and Russia are currently engaged 
in negotiations to replace START with a new treaty before the end of this 
year.
Then U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gor-
bachev signed START on July 31, 1991, after a decade of contentious 
negotiations and only months before the USSR's disintegration. The 
accord required both countries to decrease their strategic holdings to 
6,000 nuclear warheads on a maximum of 1,600 strategic delivery sys-
tems (land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles or long-range bombers) by 
December 5, 2001. START did not come into force until December 5, 
1994, after the parties agreed that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine would serve as legal successors to the Soviet Union for the pur-
poses of the treaty. START's initial duration was set to fifteen years, but 
the parties could agree to its extension for successive five-year periods. 
Each side also has the right to withdraw from the treaty by giving the 
other party six months notice. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin 
negotiated a START II treaty that would have required deeper reductions, 
but the Russian Duma and the U.S. Congress failed to agree on 
mutually-acceptable terms of ratification.
Strategic delivery systems for both countries include the three main com-
ponents of the traditional nuclear triad—land-based Intercontinental Bal-
listic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 
and long-range heavy bombers. All three systems are capable of attacking 
targets at great distances (over 5,000 kilometers), allowing a delivery 
platform based in Russia to reach the United States and vice-versa.
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The Quest for Strategic Flexibility
Bush administration officials valued strategic flexibility to adjust the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal rapidly to meet unanticipated strategic challenges as well 
as to avail of technological opportunities. They considered comprehensive 
strategic arms control treaties largely irrelevant in a world in which 
threats from transnational terrorists and states of proliferation concern 
had become more important than fears of a confrontation between Mos-
cow and Washington. Instead, they relied upon other measures such as 
export controls, interdiction, and sanctions to ensure international secu-
rity. However, American officials did not entirely repudiate traditional 
arms control measures. Administration representatives argued that the 
implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or 
Moscow Treaty), signed in May 2002, would suffice to place the U.S.-
Russian bilateral strategic arms control relationship on a stable basis 
despite complications arising from the treaty's lack of verification mea-
sures and other ambiguities associated with the two-page document.
U.S. Policy to Date
During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama 
promised to pursue negotiations to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear force 
levels. This policy was tested immediately following Obama's inaugura-
tion when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made his November 5th 
threat to target countries in northeast Europe with Iskander short-range 
missiles if Washington did not scrap the ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
deployments planned for Poland and the Czech Republic.2 Upon assum-
ing office, President Obama directed a "reset" of bilateral relations, spear-
headed by the U.S. Department of State. This comprehensive 
re-positioning of Washington's Russia policy—which administration offi-
cials also expect will involve major changes in Russia's foreign and 
defense policies—is envisaged to include renewed attention to arms con-
trol issues; specifically, the negotiation of an accord to replace the START 
treaty. Official talks to this end began on April 24, 2009.
The opening of the negotiations for START followed a very positive recep-
tion to President Barack Obama's Prague speech earlier that month reaf-
firming the U.S. commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, which 
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have both endorsed. UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the "new momentum for disar-
mament"3 represented by the start of the Russia-America talks. The two 
governments are aiming to sign a replacement accord this Fall. This 
would allow legislative bodies in both countries to examine and ratify the 
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new text by December 2009. However, it is far from certain whether the 
parties will be able to overcome the major arms control differences sepa-
rating them by the December deadline; nevertheless, Presidents Obama 
and Medvedev had high hopes to finalize the treaty text during a July 
2009 meeting in Moscow.
White House officials hailed the July 6–8, 2009 Russian-American sum-
mit as an overall success, pointing to the numerous agreements reached 
while conceding that it would be impossible to "solve everything in two 
days."4 Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed several documents at the 
meeting, including a joint understanding that commits the United States 
and Russia to reduce their strategic warheads to a range of 1500–1675 
and their strategic delivery vehicles to a range of 500–1100.5 Moscow and 
Washington would be required to meet these limits within seven years 
after the new treaty enters into force. The two leaders also agreed to 
resume military contacts suspended after the August 2008 Georgia war, 
reached a deal allowing coalition forces to transport lethal equipment and 
troops bound for Afghanistan through Russian territory and airspace,6 
and committed to jointly analyzing "ballistic missile challenges of the 21st 
century,"7 and to intensify their dialogue regarding the establishment of 
the Joint Data Exchange Center for missile launches.
Many issues continue to divide the two sides and these issues may pre-
clude, or at least hinder, the conclusion of an agreement to replace 
START. For example, Obama and Medvedev disagree regarding Russia's 
recent dismemberment of Georgia and, more broadly, Moscow's policies 
towards countries it considers as its "near abroad," such as Ukraine and 
the Central Asian states. In addition, the presidents were unable to reach 
consensus regarding the proposed deployment of U.S. BMD components 
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the U.S. administration has 
not yet made a policy decision on this issue, President Obama declined to 
link the BMD system with the current START negotiations—the preferred 
position of his Russian interlocutors.
The Russian Angle
Russian negotiators are pushing for a new, formal treaty that would 
replace START and supersede SORT.8 The Kremlin wants the new accord 
to be legally binding and more detailed than SORT, which it perceives as 
insufficiently constraining to ensure predictability and parity in the Rus-
sian-American strategic nuclear relationship. For example, Moscow 
favors firm limits on the number of U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery 
vehicles, as well as restrictions on their possible long-term deployment in 
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foreign countries (e.g., to exclude the deployment of U.S. strategic bomb-
ers in former Soviet bloc countries near Russia). They also want to be able 
to increase the number of warheads aboard some Russian missiles, have 
fewer limitations on the movements of their existing nuclear forces (e.g., 
Russia's road-mobile Topol-Ms), and enjoy greater freedom to modernize 
their nuclear forces to ensure their ability to overcome the expanding U.S. 
ballistic missile defenses network.9
Russian officials are open to eliminating some of START's more burden-
some implementation requirements, if only to reduce the expenses associ-
ated with meeting these provisions (especially those associated with the 
costly short-notice inspections).10 Russian negotiators and their Ameri-
can counterparts generally support retaining some of the detailed verifi-
cation and data exchange provisions that have long characterized 
strategic arms control agreements rather than adopting the less formal 
transparency regime favored by the George W. Bush administration.11 In 
addition, Russian representatives would like to require the United States 
to eliminate warheads removed from its active stockpile rather than sim-
ply placing them in storage, which makes them potentially available for 
re-entry into the operational force. Putin and other Russian leaders have 
long complained about Washington's policy of placing "aside a couple of 
hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day."12
Ongoing Negotiations
The April negotiations which took place at the residence of the U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom in London, although largely sym-
bolic, resulted in the adoption of two declarations and a clarification of 
the two sides' initial negotiating positions. The first communiqué 
addressed the issue of strategic offensive weapons,13 while the second was 
concerned with the general framework of U.S.-Russian relations includ-
ing various arms control issues and regional security.14
By adopting a bilateral arms control declaration that underscores the 
long-term goal of destroying nuclear weapons as a whole, Washington 
and Moscow pledged to engage in a gradual process aimed at achieving 
new and verifiable reductions of their strategic arsenals. A new 
legally-binding agreement will be a part of this paradigm.
One of the most important issues dividing the two parties is which war-
heads to count. The United States still objects to the Russian proposal to 
count warheads that are in storage or are being refurbished. However, 
Russian officials have repeatedly voiced concerns that Washington could 
quickly "re-upload" these warheads if the occasion arises.15 Russian and 
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American diplomats must also agree on which prohibitions, restrictions, 
and other provisions already present in START, should be included in the 
new accord. Moreover, they need to establish the number of warheads 
that each side is permitted to retain.
The new agreement will contain a bilateral ceiling of 1500–1675 war-
heads, only a moderate reduction in the ceiling established by the 2002 
Moscow Treaty (2200–1700 warheads). However, once the new treaty is 
enacted, U.S. officials intend to open talks to cut arms more deeply.16 
Russian military commanders worry that such measures could destabilize 
strategic parity between Moscow and Washington and add that any 
accord, which reduces the number of allowable warheads below 1500 
would have to include provisions for restricting U.S. missile defense. Crit-
ics of Obama, who has articulated a broad nonproliferation agenda, 
including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, urge the adminis-
tration not to conclude a successor agreement to START until the Nuclear 
Posture Review, a document which establishes policies and strategies for 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, has been completed and assessed by Congress. 
One report argues that it would be "ill advised" to consider cuts below 
1700 warheads in a START follow-on agreement due to "the immense 
advantage the Kremlin enjoys in nonstrategic weapons and the threat 
they pose to the former Soviet republics and American allies on Russia's 
littoral."17 Nevertheless, the joint statements adopted by the American 
and Russian Presidents in London and Moscow clearly demonstrate that 
both sides would like to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons 
in the future.
Success not Guaranteed
Although it is difficult to foresee possible solutions to many outstanding 
technical issues, in the past, factors external to the agreement have posed 
serious obstacles to the conclusion of a strategic arms control accord. 
Some observers note that bilateral strategic arms control negotiations fur-
ther U.S.-Russian relations. However, usually the causality is reversed. 
Positive overall ties determine the success of arms control negotiations. 
The history of the past several decades shows that rather than using arms 
control discussions as a vehicle to improve bilateral ties, oftentimes suc-
cess in arms control requires good bilateral relations between Moscow 
and Washington.
Historically, disruptive external factors included disagreement on other 
aspects of arms control as well as unrelated and unconnected interna-
tional security issues. For example, divergent views on NATO enlarge-
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ment and the Kosovo war led the Russian Duma to postpone ratification 
of START II. Likewise, Russia's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan prompted 
the U.S. Senate to refuse to ratify SALT II.
Russian and American leaders already have identified other concerns that 
could impede START negotiations. These issues encompass missile 
defense, mid-range nuclear missiles, short-range tactical nuclear missiles, 
conventional military force reductions, and questions regarding the stra-
tegic forces of other nuclear states. Geopolitical issues, which have the 
potential to derail the strategic weapons negotiations, include further 
NATO enlargement, Russian policy toward other former Soviet republics, 
especially Georgia and Ukraine, as well as differences between Washing-
ton and Moscow regarding Iran.
Policy Prerogatives Moving Forward
The Obama administration has yet to conclude the policy review of U.S. 
missile defense. Decisions in this regard partially hinge on the progress of 
Iran in developing dual-use nuclear and missile technologies. President 
Obama's letter to his Russian counterpart underlined the link between 
U.S. missile defense and the Iranian threat.18 In the same missive, Obama 
noted that, should international efforts achieve the goal of rolling back 
Tehran's attempts to develop missile and nuclear weapons, in which 
Washington ascribes an important role to Moscow, the need for an Amer-
ican missile defense system would decline in tandem.
In the best-case scenario, the two governments would cooperate on the 
Iranian issue. Initial steps in this regard were taken at the Moscow sum-
mit when Presidents Obama and Medvedev pledged to jointly evaluate the 
threat posed by Tehran. This approach may help to avert the near-term 
danger posed by Tehran developing indigenous nuclear weapons and 
establish the basis of a long-term partnership in other nonproliferation 
areas.
The focus on nuclear arms control could further the "reset" of American 
policy towards Russia. However, history demonstrates that problems in 
unrelated spheres of the U.S.-Russian relationship frequently hinder 
progress in bilateral arms control negotiations if the former are not 
addressed promptly. These disagreements may increase the likelihood 
that misunderstandings could inadvertently lead to missed opportunities 
for mutually beneficial arms reductions.
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